To allow external admin authority to override default BPF FS location
(/sys/fs/bpf) for implicit BPF token creation, teach libbpf to recognize
LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar. If it is specified and user application
didn't explicitly specify neither bpf_token_path nor bpf_token_fd
option, it will be treated exactly like bpf_token_path option,
overriding default /sys/fs/bpf location and making BPF token mandatory.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-10-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add BPF token support to BPF object-level functionality.
BPF token is supported by BPF object logic either as an explicitly
provided BPF token from outside (through BPF FS path or explicit BPF
token FD), or implicitly (unless prevented through
bpf_object_open_opts).
Implicit mode is assumed to be the most common one for user namespaced
unprivileged workloads. The assumption is that privileged container
manager sets up default BPF FS mount point at /sys/fs/bpf with BPF token
delegation options (delegate_{cmds,maps,progs,attachs} mount options).
BPF object during loading will attempt to create BPF token from
/sys/fs/bpf location, and pass it for all relevant operations
(currently, map creation, BTF load, and program load).
In this implicit mode, if BPF token creation fails due to whatever
reason (BPF FS is not mounted, or kernel doesn't support BPF token,
etc), this is not considered an error. BPF object loading sequence will
proceed with no BPF token.
In explicit BPF token mode, user provides explicitly either custom BPF
FS mount point path or creates BPF token on their own and just passes
token FD directly. In such case, BPF object will either dup() token FD
(to not require caller to hold onto it for entire duration of BPF object
lifetime) or will attempt to create BPF token from provided BPF FS
location. If BPF token creation fails, that is considered a critical
error and BPF object load fails with an error.
Libbpf provides a way to disable implicit BPF token creation, if it
causes any troubles (BPF token is designed to be completely optional and
shouldn't cause any problems even if provided, but in the world of BPF
LSM, custom security logic can be installed that might change outcome
dependin on the presence of BPF token). To disable libbpf's default BPF
token creation behavior user should provide either invalid BPF token FD
(negative), or empty bpf_token_path option.
BPF token presence can influence libbpf's feature probing, so if BPF
object has associated BPF token, feature probing is instructed to use
BPF object-specific feature detection cache and token FD.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Adjust feature probing callbacks to take into account optional token_fd.
In unprivileged contexts, some feature detectors would fail to detect
kernel support just because BPF program, BPF map, or BTF object can't be
loaded due to privileged nature of those operations. So when BPF object
is loaded with BPF token, this token should be used for feature probing.
This patch is setting support for this scenario, but we don't yet pass
non-zero token FD. This will be added in the next patch.
We also switched BPF cookie detector from using kprobe program to
tracepoint one, as tracepoint is somewhat less dangerous BPF program
type and has higher likelihood of being allowed through BPF token in the
future. This change has no effect on detection behavior.
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add feat_supported() helper that accepts feature cache instead of
bpf_object. This allows low-level code in bpf.c to not know or care
about higher-level concept of bpf_object, yet it will be able to utilize
custom feature checking in cases where BPF token might influence the
outcome.
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
To stay consistent with the naming pattern used for similar cases in BPF
UAPI (__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE, etc), rename MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE into
__MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE.
Also similar to MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE and MAX_BPF_REG, add:
#define MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE __MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE
Not all __MAX_xxx enums have such #define, so I'm not sure if we should
add it or not, but I figured I'll start with a completely backwards
compatible way, and we can drop that, if necessary.
Also adjust a selftest that used MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE enum.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206190920.1651226-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow user to specify token_fd for bpf_btf_load() API that wraps
kernel's BPF_BTF_LOAD command. This allows loading BTF from unprivileged
process as long as it has BPF token allowing BPF_BTF_LOAD command, which
can be created and delegated by privileged process.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-15-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. Wire through a set of
allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF
token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable()
checks everywhere where it's relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading
through delegated BPF token. BTF loading is a pretty straightforward
operation, so as long as BPF token is created with allow_cmds granting
BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating
BTF object.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).
BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Without needing to modify tons of BPF selftests file, make sure we don't
pass BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS to kernel, to make BPF selftests work on
4.9 and 5.5 kernels.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Add simple sanity checks that validate well-formed ranges (min <= max)
across u64, s64, u32, and s32 ranges. Also for cases when the value is
constant (either 64-bit or 32-bit), we validate that ranges and tnums
are in agreement.
These bounds checks are performed at the end of BPF_ALU/BPF_ALU64
operations, on conditional jumps, and for LDX instructions (where subreg
zero/sign extension is probably the most important to check). This
covers most of the interesting cases.
Also, we validate the sanity of the return register when manually
adjusting it for some special helpers.
By default, sanity violation will trigger a warning in verifier log and
resetting register bounds to "unbounded" ones. But to aid development
and debugging, BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT flag is added, which will
trigger hard failure of verification with -EFAULT on register bounds
violations. This allows selftests to catch such issues. veristat will
also gain a CLI option to enable this behavior.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112010609.848406-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Apply fe69a1b1b6ed ("selftests: bpf: xskxceiver: ksft_print_msg: fix
format type error") to make bpf-next build.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Fix too eager assumption that SHT_GNU_verdef ELF section is going to be
present whenever binary has SHT_GNU_versym section. It seems like either
SHT_GNU_verdef or SHT_GNU_verneed can be used, so failing on missing
SHT_GNU_verdef actually breaks use cases in production.
One specific reported issue, which was used to manually test this fix,
was trying to attach to `readline` function in BASH binary.
Fixes: bb7fa09399b9 ("libbpf: Support symbol versioning for uprobe")
Reported-by: Liam Wisehart <liamwisehart@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Manu Bretelle <chantr4@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Acked-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231016182840.4033346-1-andrii@kernel.org
It doesn't work on 5.5 and was just recently introduced as a new subtest
to already existing test. Add subtest to denylist.
Also clean up old denylist, leaving only "exception" relative to
ALLOWLIST.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
GCC started complaining that some of libbpf pr_warn() statements might
be passing NULL for map name. Map name is never NULL for non-NULL map
pointer, so this is a false positive which triggers build failures.
Silence format-overflow warning altogether to avoid this in the future
as well.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Syncing latest libbpf commits from kernel repository.
Baseline bpf-next commit: a3e7e6b17946f48badce98d7ac360678a0ea7393
Checkpoint bpf-next commit: 0a55264cf966fb95ebf9d03d9f81fa992f069312
Baseline bpf commit: 496720b7cfb6574a8f6f4d434f23e3d1e6cfaeb9
Checkpoint bpf commit: 23d775f12dcd23d052a4927195f15e970e27ab26
Alan Maguire (1):
bpf: sync tools/ uapi header with
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1):
tools headers uapi: Sync linux/fcntl.h with the kernel sources
Daniel Borkmann (5):
bpf: Add generic attach/detach/query API for multi-progs
bpf: Add fd-based tcx multi-prog infra with link support
libbpf: Add opts-based attach/detach/query API for tcx
libbpf: Add link-based API for tcx
libbpf: Add helper macro to clear opts structs
Daniel Xu (1):
netfilter: bpf: Support BPF_F_NETFILTER_IP_DEFRAG in netfilter link
Dave Marchevsky (1):
libbpf: Support triple-underscore flavors for kfunc relocation
Jiri Olsa (1):
bpf: Add support for bpf_get_func_ip helper for uprobe program
Lorenz Bauer (1):
bpf, net: Support SO_REUSEPORT sockets with bpf_sk_assign
Maciej Fijalkowski (1):
xsk: add new netlink attribute dedicated for ZC max frags
Magnus Karlsson (2):
selftests/xsk: transmit and receive multi-buffer packets
selftests/xsk: add basic multi-buffer test
Marco Vedovati (1):
libbpf: Set close-on-exec flag on gzopen
Sergey Kacheev (1):
libbpf: Use local includes inside the library
Stanislav Fomichev (1):
ynl: regenerate all headers
Yafang Shao (2):
bpf: Support ->fill_link_info for kprobe_multi
bpf: Support ->fill_link_info for perf_event
Yonghong Song (1):
bpf: Support new sign-extension load insns
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 5 ++
include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h | 9 +++
include/uapi/linux/netdev.h | 4 +-
src/bpf.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
src/bpf.h | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
src/bpf_tracing.h | 2 +-
src/libbpf.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
src/libbpf.h | 18 ++++-
src/libbpf.map | 2 +
src/libbpf_common.h | 16 +++++
src/netlink.c | 5 ++
src/usdt.bpf.h | 4 +-
13 files changed, 423 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
realloc() and reallocarray() can either return NULL or a special
non-NULL pointer, if their size argument is zero. This requires a bit
more care to handle NULL-as-valid-result situation differently from
NULL-as-error case. This has caused real issues before ([0]), and just
recently bit again in production when performing bpf_program__attach_usdt().
This patch fixes 4 places that do or potentially could suffer from this
mishandling of NULL, including the reported USDT-related one.
There are many other places where realloc()/reallocarray() is used and
NULL is always treated as an error value, but all those have guarantees
that their size is always non-zero, so those spot don't need any extra
handling.
[0] d08ab82f59d5 ("libbpf: Fix double-free when linker processes empty sections")
Fixes: 999783c8bbda ("libbpf: Wire up spec management and other arch-independent USDT logic")
Fixes: b63b3c490eee ("libbpf: Add bpf_program__set_insns function")
Fixes: 697f104db8a6 ("libbpf: Support custom SEC() handlers")
Fixes: b12688267280 ("libbpf: Change the order of data and text relocations.")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230711024150.1566433-1-andrii@kernel.org
Don't reset recorded sec_def handler unconditionally on
bpf_program__set_type(). There are two situations where this is wrong.
First, if the program type didn't actually change. In that case original
SEC handler should work just fine.
Second, catch-all custom SEC handler is supposed to work with any BPF
program type and SEC() annotation, so it also doesn't make sense to
reset that.
This patch fixes both issues. This was reported recently in the context
of breaking perf tool, which uses custom catch-all handler for fancy BPF
prologue generation logic. This patch should fix the issue.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/ab865e6d-06c5-078e-e404-7f90686db50d@amd.com/
Fixes: d6e6286a12e7 ("libbpf: disassociate section handler on explicit bpf_program__set_type() call")
Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230707231156.1711948-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Make sure that libbpf code always gets FD with O_CLOEXEC flag set,
regardless if file is open through open() or fopen(). For the latter
this means to add "e" to mode string, which is supported since pretty
ancient glibc v2.7.
Also drop the outdated TODO comment in usdt.c, which was already completed.
Suggested-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230525221311.2136408-1-andrii@kernel.org
Current UAPI of BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET commands of bpf() syscall
forces users to specify pinning location as a string-based absolute or
relative (to current working directory) path. This has various
implications related to security (e.g., symlink-based attacks), forces
BPF FS to be exposed in the file system, which can cause races with
other applications.
One of the feedbacks we got from folks working with containers heavily
was that inability to use purely FD-based location specification was an
unfortunate limitation and hindrance for BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET
commands. This patch closes this oversight, adding path_fd field to
BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET UAPI, following conventions established by
*at() syscalls for dirfd + pathname combinations.
This now allows interesting possibilities like working with detached BPF
FS mount (e.g., to perform multiple pinnings without running a risk of
someone interfering with them), and generally making pinning/getting
more secure and not prone to any races and/or security attacks.
This is demonstrated by a selftest added in subsequent patch that takes
advantage of new mount APIs (fsopen, fsconfig, fsmount) to demonstrate
creating detached BPF FS mount, pinning, and then getting BPF map out of
it, all while never exposing this private instance of BPF FS to outside
worlds.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523170013.728457-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Müller <deso@posteo.net>
It seems like __builtin_offset() doesn't preserve CO-RE field
relocations properly. So if offsetof() macro is defined through
__builtin_offset(), CO-RE-enabled BPF code using container_of() will be
subtly and silently broken.
To avoid this problem, redefine offsetof() and container_of() in the
form that works with CO-RE relocations more reliably.
Fixes: 5fbc220862fc ("tools/libpf: Add offsetof/container_of macro in bpf_helpers.h")
Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230509065502.2306180-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Müller <deso@posteo.net>
Mark bpf_iter_num_{new,next,destroy}() kfuncs declared for
bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() macros as __weak to allow users to feature-detect
their presence and guard bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() loops accordingly for
backwards compatibility with old kernels.
Now that libbpf supports kfunc calls poisoning and better reporting of
unresolved (but called) kfuncs, declaring number iterator kfuncs in
bpf_helpers.h won't degrade user experience and won't cause unnecessary
kernel feature dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418002148.3255690-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
To make it easier for bleeding-edge BPF applications, such as sched_ext,
to utilize open-coded iterators, move bpf_for(), bpf_for_each(), and
bpf_repeat() macros from selftests/bpf-internal bpf_misc.h helper, to
libbpf-provided bpf_helpers.h header.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418002148.3255690-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently, libbpf leaves `call #0` instruction for __weak unresolved
kfuncs, which might lead to a confusing verifier log situations, where
invalid `call #0` will be treated as successfully validated.
We can do better. Libbpf already has an established mechanism of
poisoning instructions that failed some form of resolution (e.g., CO-RE
relocation and BPF map set to not be auto-created). Libbpf doesn't fail
them outright to allow users to guard them through other means, and as
long as BPF verifier can prove that such poisoned instructions cannot be
ever reached, this doesn't consistute an invalid BPF program. If user
didn't guard such code, libbpf will extract few pieces of information to
tie such poisoned instructions back to additional information about what
entitity wasn't resolved (e.g., BPF map name, or CO-RE relocation
information).
__weak unresolved kfuncs fit this model well, so this patch extends
libbpf with poisioning and log fixup logic for kfunc calls.
Note, this poisoning is done only for kfunc *calls*, not kfunc address
resolution (ldimm64 instructions). The former cannot be ever valid, if
reached, so it's safe to poison them. The latter is a valid mechanism to
check if __weak kfunc ksym was resolved, and do necessary guarding and
work arounds based on this result, supported in most recent kernels. As
such, libbpf keeps such ldimm64 instructions as loading zero, never
poisoning them.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418002148.3255690-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently libbpf always reports "kernel" as a source of ksym BTF type,
which is ambiguous given ksym's BTF can come from either vmlinux or
kernel module BTFs. Make this explicit and log module name, if used BTF
is from kernel module.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418002148.3255690-3-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Normalize internal constants, field names, and comments related to log
fixup. Also add explicit `ext_idx` alias for relocation where relocation
is pointing to extern description for additional information.
No functional changes, just a clean up before subsequent additions.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418002148.3255690-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add output-only log_true_size field to bpf_prog_load_opts to return
bpf_attr->log_true_size value back from bpf() syscall.
Note, that we have to drop const modifier from opts in bpf_prog_load().
This could potentially cause compilation error for some users. But
the usual practice is to define bpf_prog_load_ops
as a local variable next to bpf_prog_load() call and pass pointer to it,
so const vs non-const makes no difference and won't even come up in most
(if not all) cases.
There are no runtime and ABI backwards/forward compatibility issues at all.
If user provides old struct bpf_prog_load_opts, libbpf won't set new
fields. If old libbpf is provided new bpf_prog_load_opts, nothing will
happen either as old libbpf doesn't yet know about this new field.
Adding a new variant of bpf_prog_load() just for this seems like a big
and unnecessary overkill. As a corroborating evidence is the fact that
entire selftests/bpf code base required not adjustment whatsoever.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-16-andrii@kernel.org
Add output-only log_true_size and btf_log_true_size field to
BPF_PROG_LOAD and BPF_BTF_LOAD commands, respectively. It will return
the size of log buffer necessary to fit in all the log contents at
specified log_level. This is very useful for BPF loader libraries like
libbpf to be able to size log buffer correctly, but could be used by
users directly, if necessary, as well.
This patch plumbs all this through the code, taking into account actual
bpf_attr size provided by user to determine if these new fields are
expected by users. And if they are, set them from kernel on return.
We refactory btf_parse() function to accommodate this, moving attr and
uattr handling inside it. The rest is very straightforward code, which
is split from the logging accounting changes in the previous patch to
make it simpler to review logic vs UAPI changes.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-13-andrii@kernel.org
We don't need to archive assets/ subdir when packaging libbpf sources in
retsnoop and veristat repos. Mark assets/ as export-ignore to skip it.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
If user explicitly overrides programs's type with
bpf_program__set_type() API call, we need to disassociate whatever
SEC_DEF handler libbpf determined initially based on program's SEC()
definition, as it's not goind to be valid anymore and could lead to
crashes and/or confusing failures.
Also, fix up bpf_prog_test_load() helper in selftests/bpf, which is
force-setting program type (even if that's completely unnecessary; this
is quite a legacy piece of code), and thus should expect auto-attach to
not work, yet one of the tests explicitly relies on auto-attach for
testing.
Instead, force-set program type only if it differs from the desired one.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327185202.1929145-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Müller <deso@posteo.net>
Seems like deafult branch was renamed s/master/main/, adopt libbpf CI to
not fail.
Reported-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Seems like upstream LLVM/Clang packaging still has issues with
llvm/clang 17. Fallback to 16 again, for now.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Implement the first open-coded iterator type over a range of integers.
It's public API consists of:
- bpf_iter_num_new() constructor, which accepts [start, end) range
(that is, start is inclusive, end is exclusive).
- bpf_iter_num_next() which will keep returning read-only pointer to int
until the range is exhausted, at which point NULL will be returned.
If bpf_iter_num_next() is kept calling after this, NULL will be
persistently returned.
- bpf_iter_num_destroy() destructor, which needs to be called at some
point to clean up iterator state. BPF verifier enforces that iterator
destructor is called at some point before BPF program exits.
Note that `start = end = X` is a valid combination to setup an empty
iterator. bpf_iter_num_new() will return 0 (success) for any such
combination.
If bpf_iter_num_new() detects invalid combination of input arguments, it
returns error, resets iterator state to, effectively, empty iterator, so
any subsequent call to bpf_iter_num_next() will keep returning NULL.
BPF verifier has no knowledge that returned integers are in the
[start, end) value range, as both `start` and `end` are not statically
known and enforced: they are runtime values.
While the implementation is pretty trivial, some care needs to be taken
to avoid overflows and underflows. Subsequent selftests will validate
correctness of [start, end) semantics, especially around extremes
(INT_MIN and INT_MAX).
Similarly to bpf_loop(), we enforce that no more than BPF_MAX_LOOPS can
be specified.
bpf_iter_num_{new,next,destroy}() is a logical evolution from bounded
BPF loops and bpf_loop() helper and is the basis for implementing
ergonomic BPF loops with no statically known or verified bounds.
Subsequent patches implement bpf_for() macro, demonstrating how this can
be wrapped into something that works and feels like a normal for() loop
in C language.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Each architecture supports at least 6 syscall argument registers, so now
that specs for each architecture is defined in bpf_tracing.h, remove
unnecessary macro overrides, which previously were required to keep
existing BPF_KSYSCALL() uses compiling and working.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230120200914.3008030-26-andrii@kernel.org
Set up generic support in bpf_tracing.h for up to 7 syscall arguments
tracing with BPF_KSYSCALL, which seems to be the limit according to
syscall(2) manpage. Also change the way that syscall convention is
specified to be more explicit. Subsequent patches will adjust and define
proper per-architecture syscall conventions.
__PT_PARM1_SYSCALL_REG through __PT_PARM6_SYSCALL_REG is added
temporarily to keep everything working before each architecture has
syscall reg tables defined. They will be removed afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com> # arm64
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230120200914.3008030-13-andrii@kernel.org
Add BPF_UPROBE and BPF_URETPROBE macros, aliased to BPF_KPROBE and
BPF_KRETPROBE, respectively. This makes uprobe-based BPF program code
much less confusing, especially to people new to tracing, at no cost in
terms of maintainability. We'll use this macro in selftests in
subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230120200914.3008030-11-andrii@kernel.org
Andrii Nakryiko