Platforms like arm64 could capture privilege level information for all the
branch records. Hence this adds a new element in the struct branch_entry to
record the privilege level information, which could be requested through a
new event.attr.branch_sample_type based flag PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PRIV_SAVE.
This flag helps user choose whether privilege information is captured.
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220824044822.70230-4-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
branch_entry.type now has ran out of space to accommodate more branch types
classification. This will prevent perf branch stack implementation on arm64
(via BRBE) to capture all available branch types. Extending this bit field
i.e branch_entry.type [4 bits] is not an option as it will break user space
ABI both for little and big endian perf tools.
Extend branch classification with a new field branch_entry.new_type via a
new branch type PERF_BR_EXTEND_ABI in branch_entry.type. Perf tools which
could decode PERF_BR_EXTEND_ABI, will then parse branch_entry.new_type as
well.
branch_entry.new_type is a 4 bit field which can hold upto 16 branch types.
The first three branch types will hold various generic page faults followed
by five architecture specific branch types, which can be overridden by the
platform for specific use cases. These architecture specific branch types
gets overridden on arm64 platform for BRBE implementation.
New generic branch types
- PERF_BR_NEW_FAULT_ALGN
- PERF_BR_NEW_FAULT_DATA
- PERF_BR_NEW_FAULT_INST
New arch specific branch types
- PERF_BR_NEW_ARCH_1
- PERF_BR_NEW_ARCH_2
- PERF_BR_NEW_ARCH_3
- PERF_BR_NEW_ARCH_4
- PERF_BR_NEW_ARCH_5
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220824044822.70230-3-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
This expands generic branch type classification by adding two more entries
there in i.e system error and not in transaction. This also updates the x86
implementation to process X86_BR_NO_TX records as appropriate. This changes
branch types reported to user space on x86 platform but it should not be a
problem. The possible scenarios and impacts are enumerated here.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| kernel | perf tool | Impact |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| old | old | Works as before |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| old | new | PERF_BR_UNKNOWN is processed |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| new | old | PERF_BR_NO_TX is blocked via old PERF_BR_MAX |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| new | new | PERF_BR_NO_TX is recognized |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
When PERF_BR_NO_TX is blocked via old PERF_BR_MAX (new kernel with old perf
tool) the user space might throw up an warning complaining about an
unrecognized branch types being reported, but it's expected. PERF_BR_SERROR
& PERF_BR_NO_TX branch types will be used for BRBE implementation on arm64
platform.
PERF_BR_NO_TX complements 'abort' and 'in_tx' elements in perf_branch_entry
which represent other transaction states for a given branch record. Because
this completes the transaction state classification.
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220824044822.70230-2-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
This expands generic branch type classification by adding two more entries
there in i.e irq and exception return. Also updates the x86 implementation
to process X86_BR_IRET and X86_BR_IRQ records as appropriate. This changes
branch types reported to user space on x86 platform but it should not be a
problem. The possible scenarios and impacts are enumerated here.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1645681014-3346-1-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com