It's been reported that (void *)map->map_extra is causing compilation
warnings on 32-bit architectures. It's easy enough to fix this by
casting to long first.
Fixes: 79ff13e99169 ("libbpf: Add support for bpf_arena.")
Reported-by: Ryan Eatmon <reatmon@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20240319215143.1279312-1-andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Wire up BPF cookie for raw tracepoint programs (both BTF and non-BTF
aware variants). This brings them up to part w.r.t. BPF cookie usage
with classic tracepoint and fentry/fexit programs.
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20240319233852.1977493-4-andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
LLVM automatically places __arena variables into ".arena.1" ELF section.
In order to use such global variables bpf program must include definition
of arena map in ".maps" section, like:
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA);
__uint(map_flags, BPF_F_MMAPABLE);
__uint(max_entries, 1000); /* number of pages */
__ulong(map_extra, 2ull << 44); /* start of mmap() region */
} arena SEC(".maps");
libbpf recognizes both uses of arena and creates single `struct bpf_map *`
instance in libbpf APIs.
".arena.1" ELF section data is used as initial data image, which is exposed
through skeleton and bpf_map__initial_value() to the user, if they need to tune
it before the load phase. During load phase, this initial image is copied over
into mmap()'ed region corresponding to arena, and discarded.
Few small checks here and there had to be added to make sure this
approach works with bpf_map__initial_value(), mostly due to hard-coded
assumption that map->mmaped is set up with mmap() syscall and should be
munmap()'ed. For arena, .arena.1 can be (much) smaller than maximum
arena size, so this smaller data size has to be tracked separately.
Given it is enforced that there is only one arena for entire bpf_object
instance, we just keep it in a separate field. This can be generalized
if necessary later.
All global variables from ".arena.1" section are accessible from user space
via skel->arena->name_of_var.
For bss/data/rodata the skeleton/libbpf perform the following sequence:
1. addr = mmap(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
2. user space optionally modifies global vars
3. map_fd = bpf_create_map()
4. bpf_update_map_elem(map_fd, addr) // to store values into the kernel
5. mmap(addr, MAP_FIXED, map_fd)
after step 5 user spaces see the values it wrote at step 2 at the same addresses
arena doesn't support update_map_elem. Hence skeleton/libbpf do:
1. addr = malloc(sizeof SEC ".arena.1")
2. user space optionally modifies global vars
3. map_fd = bpf_create_map(MAP_TYPE_ARENA)
4. real_addr = mmap(map->map_extra, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, map_fd)
5. memcpy(real_addr, addr) // this will fault-in and allocate pages
At the end look and feel of global data vs __arena global data is the same from
bpf prog pov.
Another complication is:
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA);
} arena SEC(".maps");
int __arena foo;
int bar;
ptr1 = &foo; // relocation against ".arena.1" section
ptr2 = &arena; // relocation against ".maps" section
ptr3 = &bar; // relocation against ".bss" section
Fo the kernel ptr1 and ptr2 has point to the same arena's map_fd
while ptr3 points to a different global array's map_fd.
For the verifier:
ptr1->type == unknown_scalar
ptr2->type == const_ptr_to_map
ptr3->type == ptr_to_map_value
After verification, from JIT pov all 3 ptr-s are normal ld_imm64 insns.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin@isovalent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-11-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
bpf tree has fixes for xdp_bonding selftests which are not yet in
bpf-next, so add them as temporary CI-only patches.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
We get:
libbpf: struct_ops init_kern: struct bpf_dummy_ops is not found in kernel BTF
So even though it's irrelevant to the subtests we do want to test,
entire test has to be skipped, unfortunately.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
If PERF_EVENT program has __arg_ctx argument with matching
architecture-specific pt_regs/user_pt_regs/user_regs_struct pointer
type, libbpf should still perform type rewrite for old kernels, but not
emit the warning. Fix copy/paste from kernel code where 0 is meant to
signify "no error" condition. For libbpf we need to return "true" to
proceed with type rewrite (which for PERF_EVENT program will be
a canonical `struct bpf_perf_event_data *` type).
Fixes: 9eea8fafe33e ("libbpf: fix __arg_ctx type enforcement for perf_event programs")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206002243.1439450-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allowlist test_global_funcs/arg_tag_ctx* and a few of
verifier_global_subprogs subtests that validate libbpf's logic for
rewriting __arg_ctx globl subprog argument types on kernels that don't
natively support __arg_ctx.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Another API that was declared in libbpf.map but actual implementation
was missing. btf_ext__get_raw_data() was intended as a discouraged alias
to consistently-named btf_ext__raw_data(), so make this an actuality.
Fixes: 20eccf29e297 ("libbpf: hide and discourage inconsistently named getters")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240201172027.604869-5-andrii@kernel.org
LIBBPF_API annotation seems missing on libbpf_set_memlock_rlim API, so
add it to make this API callable from libbpf's shared library version.
Fixes: e542f2c4cd16 ("libbpf: Auto-bump RLIMIT_MEMLOCK if kernel needs it for BPF")
Fixes: ab9a5a05dc48 ("libbpf: fix up few libbpf.map problems")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240201172027.604869-3-andrii@kernel.org
Add bpf_core_cast() macro that wraps bpf_rdonly_cast() kfunc. It's more
ergonomic than kfunc, as it automatically extracts btf_id with
bpf_core_type_id_kernel(), and works with type names. It also casts result
to (T *) pointer. See the definition of the macro, it's self-explanatory.
libbpf declares bpf_rdonly_cast() extern as __weak __ksym and should be
safe to not conflict with other possible declarations in user code.
But we do have a conflict with current BPF selftests that declare their
externs with first argument as `void *obj`, while libbpf opts into more
permissive `const void *obj`. This causes conflict, so we fix up BPF
selftests uses in the same patch.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130212023.183765-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Add __arg_trusted to annotate global func args that accept trusted
PTR_TO_BTF_ID arguments.
Also add __arg_nullable to combine with __arg_trusted (and maybe other
tags in the future) to force global subprog itself (i.e., callee) to do
NULL checks, as opposed to default non-NULL semantics (and thus caller's
responsibility to ensure non-NULL values).
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130000648.2144827-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This replicates kernel upstream setup and brings READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE() macros anywhere where linux/kernel.h is included, which is
assumption libbpf code makes.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Libbpf got new source code file, features.c, we need to add it to
Makefile here on Github version as well.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Add BPF_CALL_REL() macro implementation into include/linux/filter.h
header, which is now used by libbpf code for feature detection.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To allow external admin authority to override default BPF FS location
(/sys/fs/bpf) for implicit BPF token creation, teach libbpf to recognize
LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar. If it is specified and user application
didn't explicitly specify bpf_token_path option, it will be treated
exactly like bpf_token_path option, overriding default /sys/fs/bpf
location and making BPF token mandatory.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-29-andrii@kernel.org
Add BPF token support to BPF object-level functionality.
BPF token is supported by BPF object logic either as an explicitly
provided BPF token from outside (through BPF FS path), or implicitly
(unless prevented through bpf_object_open_opts).
Implicit mode is assumed to be the most common one for user namespaced
unprivileged workloads. The assumption is that privileged container
manager sets up default BPF FS mount point at /sys/fs/bpf with BPF token
delegation options (delegate_{cmds,maps,progs,attachs} mount options).
BPF object during loading will attempt to create BPF token from
/sys/fs/bpf location, and pass it for all relevant operations
(currently, map creation, BTF load, and program load).
In this implicit mode, if BPF token creation fails due to whatever
reason (BPF FS is not mounted, or kernel doesn't support BPF token,
etc), this is not considered an error. BPF object loading sequence will
proceed with no BPF token.
In explicit BPF token mode, user provides explicitly custom BPF FS mount
point path. In such case, BPF object will attempt to create BPF token
from provided BPF FS location. If BPF token creation fails, that is
considered a critical error and BPF object load fails with an error.
Libbpf provides a way to disable implicit BPF token creation, if it
causes any troubles (BPF token is designed to be completely optional and
shouldn't cause any problems even if provided, but in the world of BPF
LSM, custom security logic can be installed that might change outcome
depending on the presence of BPF token). To disable libbpf's default BPF
token creation behavior user should provide either invalid BPF token FD
(negative), or empty bpf_token_path option.
BPF token presence can influence libbpf's feature probing, so if BPF
object has associated BPF token, feature probing is instructed to use
BPF object-specific feature detection cache and token FD.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-26-andrii@kernel.org
Adjust feature probing callbacks to take into account optional token_fd.
In unprivileged contexts, some feature detectors would fail to detect
kernel support just because BPF program, BPF map, or BTF object can't be
loaded due to privileged nature of those operations. So when BPF object
is loaded with BPF token, this token should be used for feature probing.
This patch is setting support for this scenario, but we don't yet pass
non-zero token FD. This will be added in the next patch.
We also switched BPF cookie detector from using kprobe program to
tracepoint one, as tracepoint is somewhat less dangerous BPF program
type and has higher likelihood of being allowed through BPF token in the
future. This change has no effect on detection behavior.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-25-andrii@kernel.org
Add feat_supported() helper that accepts feature cache instead of
bpf_object. This allows low-level code in bpf.c to not know or care
about higher-level concept of bpf_object, yet it will be able to utilize
custom feature checking in cases where BPF token might influence the
outcome.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-23-andrii@kernel.org
Allow user to specify token_fd for bpf_btf_load() API that wraps
kernel's BPF_BTF_LOAD command. This allows loading BTF from unprivileged
process as long as it has BPF token allowing BPF_BTF_LOAD command, which
can be created and delegated by privileged process.
Wire through new btf_flags as well, so that user can provide
BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag, if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-15-andrii@kernel.org
Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag
should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types,
derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we
perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org
Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading
through delegated BPF token. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag has to be specified
when passing BPF token FD. Given BPF_BTF_LOAD command didn't have flags
field before, we also add btf_flags field.
BTF loading is a pretty straightforward operation, so as long as BPF
token is created with allow_cmds granting BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel
proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating BTF object.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-6-andrii@kernel.org
Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD
for BPF_MAP_CREATE command.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-5-andrii@kernel.org
Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).
BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token. Also creating BPF token in init user namespace is
currently not supported, given BPF token doesn't have any effect in init
user namespace anyways.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-4-andrii@kernel.org
We've ran into issues with using dup2() API in production setting, where
libbpf is linked into large production environment and ends up calling
unintended custom implementations of dup2(). These custom implementations
don't provide atomic FD replacement guarantees of dup2() syscall,
leading to subtle and hard to debug issues.
To prevent this in the future and guarantee that no libc implementation
will do their own custom non-atomic dup2() implementation, call dup2()
syscall directly with syscall(SYS_dup2).
Note that some architectures don't seem to provide dup2 and have dup3
instead. Try to detect and pick best syscall.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119210201.1295511-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
On kernel that don't support arg:ctx tag, before adjusting global
subprog BTF information to match kernel's expected canonical type names,
make sure that types used by user are meaningful, and if not, warn and
don't do BTF adjustments.
This is similar to checks that kernel performs, but narrower in scope,
as only a small subset of BPF program types can be accommodated by
libbpf using canonical type names.
Libbpf unconditionally allows `struct pt_regs *` for perf_event program
types, unlike kernel, which supports that conditionally on architecture.
This is done to keep things simple and not cause unnecessary false
positives. This seems like a minor and harmless deviation, which in
real-world programs will be caught by kernels with arg:ctx tag support
anyways. So KISS principle.
This logic is hard to test (especially on latest kernels), so manual
testing was performed instead. Libbpf emitted the following warning for
perf_event program with wrong context argument type:
libbpf: prog 'arg_tag_ctx_perf': subprog 'subprog_ctx_tag' arg#0 is expected to be of `struct bpf_perf_event_data *` type
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118033143.3384355-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add feature detector of kernel-side arg:ctx (__arg_ctx) tag support. If
this is detected, libbpf will avoid doing any __arg_ctx-related BTF
rewriting and checks in favor of letting kernel handle this completely.
test_global_funcs/ctx_arg_rewrite subtest is adjusted to do the same
feature detection (albeit in much simpler, though round-about and
inefficient, way), and skip the tests. This is done to still be able to
execute this test on older kernels (like in libbpf CI).
Note, BPF token series ([0]) does a major refactor and code moving of
libbpf-internal feature detection "framework", so to avoid unnecessary
conflicts we keep newly added feature detection stand-alone with ad-hoc
result caching. Once things settle, there will be a small follow up to
re-integrate everything back and move code into its final place in
newly-added (by BPF token series) features.c file.
[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=814209&state=*
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118033143.3384355-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add lwt_reroute and tc_links_ingress to DENYLIST, as they are currently
broken due to kernel bug. Fix is underreview and should make it into
bpf-next soon.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Syncing latest libbpf commits from kernel repository.
Baseline bpf-next commit: 750011e239a50873251c16207b0fe78eabf8577e
Checkpoint bpf-next commit: 98e20e5e13d2811898921f999288be7151a11954
Baseline bpf commit: bc4fbf022c68967cb49b2b820b465cf90de974b8
Checkpoint bpf commit: 7c5e046bdcb2513f9decb3765d8bf92d604279cf
Alyssa Ross (1):
libbpf: Skip DWARF sections in linker sanity check
Amritha Nambiar (4):
netdev-genl: spec: Extend netdev netlink spec in YAML for queue
netdev-genl: spec: Extend netdev netlink spec in YAML for NAPI
netdev-genl: spec: Add irq in netdev netlink YAML spec
netdev-genl: spec: Add PID in netdev netlink YAML spec
Andrii Nakryiko (24):
bpf: introduce BPF token object
bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command
bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command
bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command
libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API
libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API
libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API
libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API
bpf: rename MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE into __MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE for consistency
libbpf: split feature detectors definitions from cached results
libbpf: further decouple feature checking logic from bpf_object
libbpf: move feature detection code into its own file
libbpf: wire up token_fd into feature probing logic
libbpf: wire up BPF token support at BPF object level
libbpf: support BPF token path setting through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH
envvar
Revert BPF token-related functionality
libbpf: add __arg_xxx macros for annotating global func args
libbpf: make uniform use of btf__fd() accessor inside libbpf
libbpf: use explicit map reuse flag to skip map creation steps
libbpf: don't rely on map->fd as an indicator of map being created
libbpf: use stable map placeholder FDs
libbpf: move exception callbacks assignment logic into relocation step
libbpf: move BTF loading step after relocation step
libbpf: implement __arg_ctx fallback logic
Daniel Xu (1):
libbpf: Add BPF_CORE_WRITE_BITFIELD() macro
David Vernet (1):
bpf: Load vmlinux btf for any struct_ops map
Eduard Zingerman (1):
libbpf: Start v1.4 development cycle
Jakub Kicinski (1):
tools: ynl: add sample for getting page-pool information
Jamal Hadi Salim (5):
net/sched: Remove uapi support for rsvp classifier
net/sched: Remove uapi support for tcindex classifier
net/sched: Remove uapi support for dsmark qdisc
net/sched: Remove uapi support for ATM qdisc
net/sched: Remove uapi support for CBQ qdisc
Jiri Olsa (2):
libbpf: Add st_type argument to elf_resolve_syms_offsets function
bpf: Add link_info support for uprobe multi link
Larysa Zaremba (1):
xdp: Add VLAN tag hint
Mingyi Zhang (1):
libbpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bpf_object__collect_prog_relos
Sergei Trofimovich (1):
libbpf: Add pr_warn() for EINVAL cases in linker_sanity_check_elf
Stanislav Fomichev (3):
xsk: Support tx_metadata_len
xsk: Add TX timestamp and TX checksum offload support
xsk: Add option to calculate TX checksum in SW
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 14 +-
include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h | 61 +++-
include/uapi/linux/netdev.h | 81 ++++-
include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h | 47 ---
include/uapi/linux/pkt_sched.h | 109 ------
src/bpf_core_read.h | 32 ++
src/bpf_helpers.h | 3 +
src/elf.c | 5 +-
src/libbpf.c | 585 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
src/libbpf.map | 3 +
src/libbpf_internal.h | 17 +-
src/libbpf_version.h | 2 +-
src/linker.c | 27 +-
13 files changed, 673 insertions(+), 313 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Out of all special global func arg tag annotations, __arg_ctx is
practically is the most immediately useful and most critical to have
working across multitude kernel version, if possible. This would allow
end users to write much simpler code if __arg_ctx semantics worked for
older kernels that don't natively understand btf_decl_tag("arg:ctx") in
verifier logic.
Luckily, it is possible to ensure __arg_ctx works on old kernels through
a bit of extra work done by libbpf, at least in a lot of common cases.
To explain the overall idea, we need to go back at how context argument
was supported in global funcs before __arg_ctx support was added. This
was done based on special struct name checks in kernel. E.g., for
BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT the expectation is that argument type `struct
bpf_perf_event_data *` mark that argument as PTR_TO_CTX. This is all
good as long as global function is used from the same BPF program types
only, which is often not the case. If the same subprog has to be called
from, say, kprobe and perf_event program types, there is no single
definition that would satisfy BPF verifier. Subprog will have context
argument either for kprobe (if using bpf_user_pt_regs_t struct name) or
perf_event (with bpf_perf_event_data struct name), but not both.
This limitation was the reason to add btf_decl_tag("arg:ctx"), making
the actual argument type not important, so that user can just define
"generic" signature:
__noinline int global_subprog(void *ctx __arg_ctx) { ... }
I won't belabor how libbpf is implementing subprograms, see a huge
comment next to bpf_object_relocate_calls() function. The idea is that
each main/entry BPF program gets its own copy of global_subprog's code
appended.
This per-program copy of global subprog code *and* associated func_info
.BTF.ext information, pointing to FUNC -> FUNC_PROTO BTF type chain
allows libbpf to simulate __arg_ctx behavior transparently, even if the
kernel doesn't yet support __arg_ctx annotation natively.
The idea is straightforward: each time we append global subprog's code
and func_info information, we adjust its FUNC -> FUNC_PROTO type
information, if necessary (that is, libbpf can detect the presence of
btf_decl_tag("arg:ctx") just like BPF verifier would do it).
The rest is just mechanical and somewhat painful BTF manipulation code.
It's painful because we need to clone FUNC -> FUNC_PROTO, instead of
reusing it, as same FUNC -> FUNC_PROTO chain might be used by another
main BPF program within the same BPF object, so we can't just modify it
in-place (and cloning BTF types within the same struct btf object is
painful due to constant memory invalidation, see comments in code).
Uploaded BPF object's BTF information has to work for all BPF
programs at the same time.
Once we have FUNC -> FUNC_PROTO clones, we make sure that instead of
using some `void *ctx` parameter definition, we have an expected `struct
bpf_perf_event_data *ctx` definition (as far as BPF verifier and kernel
is concerned), which will mark it as context for BPF verifier. Same
global subprog relocated and copied into another main BPF program will
get different type information according to main program's type. It all
works out in the end in a completely transparent way for end user.
Libbpf maintains internal program type -> expected context struct name
mapping internally. Note, not all BPF program types have named context
struct, so this approach won't work for such programs (just like it
didn't before __arg_ctx). So native __arg_ctx is still important to have
in kernel to have generic context support across all BPF program types.
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104013847.3875810-8-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Move the logic of finding and assigning exception callback indices from
BTF sanitization step to program relocations step, which seems more
logical and will unblock moving BTF loading to after relocation step.
Exception callbacks discovery and assignment has no dependency on BTF
being loaded into the kernel, it only uses BTF information. It does need
to happen before subprogram relocations happen, though. Which is why the
split.
No functional changes.
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104013847.3875810-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Move map creation to later during BPF object loading by pre-creating
stable placeholder FDs (utilizing memfd_create()). Use dup2()
syscall to then atomically make those placeholder FDs point to real
kernel BPF map objects.
This change allows to delay BPF map creation to after all the BPF
program relocations. That, in turn, allows to delay BTF finalization and
loading into kernel to after all the relocations as well. We'll take
advantage of the latter in subsequent patches to allow libbpf to adjust
BTF in a way that helps with BPF global function usage.
Clean up a few places where we close map->fd, which now shouldn't
happen, because map->fd should be a valid FD regardless of whether map
was created or not. Surprisingly and nicely it simplifies a bunch of
error handling code. If this change doesn't backfire, I'm tempted to
pre-create such stable FDs for other entities (progs, maybe even BTF).
We previously did some manipulations to make gen_loader work with fake
map FDs, with stable map FDs this hack is not necessary for maps (we
still have it for BTF, but I left it as is for now).
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104013847.3875810-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
With the upcoming switch to preallocated placeholder FDs for maps,
switch various getters/setter away from checking map->fd. Use
map_is_created() helper that detect whether BPF map can be modified based
on map->obj->loaded state, with special provision for maps set up with
bpf_map__reuse_fd().
For backwards compatibility, we take map_is_created() into account in
bpf_map__fd() getter as well. This way before bpf_object__load() phase
bpf_map__fd() will always return -1, just as before the changes in
subsequent patches adding stable map->fd placeholders.
We also get rid of all internal uses of bpf_map__fd() getter, as it's
more oriented for uses external to libbpf. The above map_is_created()
check actually interferes with some of the internal uses, if map FD is
fetched through bpf_map__fd().
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104013847.3875810-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
To allow external admin authority to override default BPF FS location
(/sys/fs/bpf) for implicit BPF token creation, teach libbpf to recognize
LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar. If it is specified and user application
didn't explicitly specify neither bpf_token_path nor bpf_token_fd
option, it will be treated exactly like bpf_token_path option,
overriding default /sys/fs/bpf location and making BPF token mandatory.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-10-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add BPF token support to BPF object-level functionality.
BPF token is supported by BPF object logic either as an explicitly
provided BPF token from outside (through BPF FS path or explicit BPF
token FD), or implicitly (unless prevented through
bpf_object_open_opts).
Implicit mode is assumed to be the most common one for user namespaced
unprivileged workloads. The assumption is that privileged container
manager sets up default BPF FS mount point at /sys/fs/bpf with BPF token
delegation options (delegate_{cmds,maps,progs,attachs} mount options).
BPF object during loading will attempt to create BPF token from
/sys/fs/bpf location, and pass it for all relevant operations
(currently, map creation, BTF load, and program load).
In this implicit mode, if BPF token creation fails due to whatever
reason (BPF FS is not mounted, or kernel doesn't support BPF token,
etc), this is not considered an error. BPF object loading sequence will
proceed with no BPF token.
In explicit BPF token mode, user provides explicitly either custom BPF
FS mount point path or creates BPF token on their own and just passes
token FD directly. In such case, BPF object will either dup() token FD
(to not require caller to hold onto it for entire duration of BPF object
lifetime) or will attempt to create BPF token from provided BPF FS
location. If BPF token creation fails, that is considered a critical
error and BPF object load fails with an error.
Libbpf provides a way to disable implicit BPF token creation, if it
causes any troubles (BPF token is designed to be completely optional and
shouldn't cause any problems even if provided, but in the world of BPF
LSM, custom security logic can be installed that might change outcome
dependin on the presence of BPF token). To disable libbpf's default BPF
token creation behavior user should provide either invalid BPF token FD
(negative), or empty bpf_token_path option.
BPF token presence can influence libbpf's feature probing, so if BPF
object has associated BPF token, feature probing is instructed to use
BPF object-specific feature detection cache and token FD.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Adjust feature probing callbacks to take into account optional token_fd.
In unprivileged contexts, some feature detectors would fail to detect
kernel support just because BPF program, BPF map, or BTF object can't be
loaded due to privileged nature of those operations. So when BPF object
is loaded with BPF token, this token should be used for feature probing.
This patch is setting support for this scenario, but we don't yet pass
non-zero token FD. This will be added in the next patch.
We also switched BPF cookie detector from using kprobe program to
tracepoint one, as tracepoint is somewhat less dangerous BPF program
type and has higher likelihood of being allowed through BPF token in the
future. This change has no effect on detection behavior.
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add feat_supported() helper that accepts feature cache instead of
bpf_object. This allows low-level code in bpf.c to not know or care
about higher-level concept of bpf_object, yet it will be able to utilize
custom feature checking in cases where BPF token might influence the
outcome.
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213190842.3844987-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
To stay consistent with the naming pattern used for similar cases in BPF
UAPI (__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE, etc), rename MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE into
__MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE.
Also similar to MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE and MAX_BPF_REG, add:
#define MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE __MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE
Not all __MAX_xxx enums have such #define, so I'm not sure if we should
add it or not, but I figured I'll start with a completely backwards
compatible way, and we can drop that, if necessary.
Also adjust a selftest that used MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE enum.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206190920.1651226-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow user to specify token_fd for bpf_btf_load() API that wraps
kernel's BPF_BTF_LOAD command. This allows loading BTF from unprivileged
process as long as it has BPF token allowing BPF_BTF_LOAD command, which
can be created and delegated by privileged process.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-15-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. Wire through a set of
allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF
token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable()
checks everywhere where it's relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading
through delegated BPF token. BTF loading is a pretty straightforward
operation, so as long as BPF token is created with allow_cmds granting
BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating
BTF object.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).
BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Without needing to modify tons of BPF selftests file, make sure we don't
pass BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS to kernel, to make BPF selftests work on
4.9 and 5.5 kernels.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Add simple sanity checks that validate well-formed ranges (min <= max)
across u64, s64, u32, and s32 ranges. Also for cases when the value is
constant (either 64-bit or 32-bit), we validate that ranges and tnums
are in agreement.
These bounds checks are performed at the end of BPF_ALU/BPF_ALU64
operations, on conditional jumps, and for LDX instructions (where subreg
zero/sign extension is probably the most important to check). This
covers most of the interesting cases.
Also, we validate the sanity of the return register when manually
adjusting it for some special helpers.
By default, sanity violation will trigger a warning in verifier log and
resetting register bounds to "unbounded" ones. But to aid development
and debugging, BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT flag is added, which will
trigger hard failure of verification with -EFAULT on register bounds
violations. This allows selftests to catch such issues. veristat will
also gain a CLI option to enable this behavior.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112010609.848406-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Apply fe69a1b1b6ed ("selftests: bpf: xskxceiver: ksft_print_msg: fix
format type error") to make bpf-next build.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Fix too eager assumption that SHT_GNU_verdef ELF section is going to be
present whenever binary has SHT_GNU_versym section. It seems like either
SHT_GNU_verdef or SHT_GNU_verneed can be used, so failing on missing
SHT_GNU_verdef actually breaks use cases in production.
One specific reported issue, which was used to manually test this fix,
was trying to attach to `readline` function in BASH binary.
Fixes: bb7fa09399b9 ("libbpf: Support symbol versioning for uprobe")
Reported-by: Liam Wisehart <liamwisehart@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Manu Bretelle <chantr4@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Acked-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231016182840.4033346-1-andrii@kernel.org
It doesn't work on 5.5 and was just recently introduced as a new subtest
to already existing test. Add subtest to denylist.
Also clean up old denylist, leaving only "exception" relative to
ALLOWLIST.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
GCC started complaining that some of libbpf pr_warn() statements might
be passing NULL for map name. Map name is never NULL for non-NULL map
pointer, so this is a false positive which triggers build failures.
Silence format-overflow warning altogether to avoid this in the future
as well.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Andrii Nakryiko